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PETITION 
Appellant Celsius Energy Company (hereinafter 
"Celsius") hereby petitions the Court, pursuant to the terms of 
Rule 3 5, Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, for rehearing of this 
appeal on the grounds and for the reasons set forth below. l 
BACKGROUND 
In its decision in this case, this Court announced the 
rule that a landowner' s correlative rights in an oil and gas pool 
may only be enforced with respect to production after a spacing 
order is entered with respect to the landowner' s property. 
Although the landowner' s correlative rights in the pool exist in 
a theoretical sense before the spacing order is entered, they are 
not defined—and therefore cannot be enforced—until the spacing 
order is entered: 
[U]nder the [Utah Oil and Gas Conservation] Act, it is 
not possible to ascertain a landowner' s correlative 
rights until the Board acquires the necessary data in a 
formal hearing, makes the findings of fact, and enters 
a spacing and drilling unit order. 
Slip OP. 8. 2 
1
 Undersigned counsel is advised that the other appellant in 
this case, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, will seek an 
extension on the time within which it must file a petition for 
rehearing. We are advised that the Board expects to act on this 
matter at its next meeting, which is scheduled for January 22, 
1992. Celsius requests that its own petition be considered along 
with any petition the Board files. 
2
 All references are to the Court' s slip opinion in this 
case, which is dated December 31, "1991. A copy of the slip 
opinion is annexed to this petition. 
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This general rule, as announced by the Court, is 
subject to an equitable exception that may arise in the case of 
exploratory or wildcat wells. As the Court stated: 
With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, 
however, where no preexisting field-wide 
spacing order has been entered, the rule is 
that a pooling order should be effective no 
earlier than the date of a spacing order, 
unless there are special circumstances which 
would make it just and equitable for an order 
to be retroactive to protect correlative 
rights established by the Act from 
inequitable or overreaching conduct. 
Slip Op. 13. Although the Court' s statement of the rule' s 
11
 special circumstances" exception is couched in terms of the 
"inequitable and overreaching conduct" of others, presumably the 
exception would extend to any special circumstances making it 
unjust to exclude a period of production prior to the entry of 
the spacing order. 
In proceedings below, the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining (hereinafter the "Board") never made a finding on the 
presence or absence of such "special circumstances;" it never had 
the opportunity to do so. Nevertheless, this Court determined 
that no such special circumstances existed in the present case 
and therefore affirmed the decision of the district court 
reversing the Board. In a closely related portion of its 
decision, this Court determined that the United States Bureau of 
Land Management (hereinafter the "BLM") (the owner of the land 
with which respondents' lands were pooled") waived its correlative 
-2-
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rights for the period before a spacing order was entered. In 
this respect also, this Court' s determination was made without 
the benefit of a finding by the Board on waiver. 
In this petition, appellant Celsius Energy Company 
respectfully submits that the Court should not have decided these 
factual issues, but should have remanded this case to the Board 
for the limited purpose of determining (1) whether special 
circumstances exist that would justify an exception to the 
general rule precluding retroactive pooling to the period before 
the spacing order, and (2) whether the BLM in fact waived its 
right to claim a share in production during the period before the 
spacing order. 
GROUNDS FOR REHEARING 
1. This Court erred in making the factual 
determination that special circumstances did not exist that would 
justify retroactive pooling to first production. That factual 
issue should be submitted to the Board, and the case should be 
remanded for that purpose. 
2. This Court erred in deciding that the BLM, through 
inaction, waived its right to claim a share of production before 
the entry of the spacing order in this case. The limited 
evidence in the record on the subject contradicts the Court's 
determination. The issue of the BLM' s alleged waiver, including 
all factual determinations implicit in the issue, should be 
-3-
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decided by the Board after a hearing in which the BLM 
participates. The case should therefore be remanded for that 
purpose as well. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE TO THE BOARD FOR 
A FACTUAL DETERMINATION AS TO THE PRESENCE OF 
"SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" THAT WOULD JUSTIFY 
RETROACTIVE POOLING 
The Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§40-6-1 e£ seq. (1988), gives the Board authority to make a 
variety of factual determinations on matters within its 
jurisdiction. Under section 40-6-6(5), the Board is required to 
determine whether the terms of its pooling orders are "just and 
reasonable," and it is precluded from entering any pooling order 
that it does not find to be just and reasonable. In this case, 
the Court established a new rule limiting the Board' s retroactive 
pooling orders to the period after a spacing order is entered 
under the terms of section 40-6-6(1), except in cases where 
"special circumstances" would make the limit unjust or 
inequitable. Slip Op. 13. Although the Court was not explicit 
about the statutory source of this exception to the general rule, 
it is obviously rooted in basic fairness and section 40-6-6(5)'s 
requirement that all pooling orders be just and reasonable. 
After announcing the general rule that should have been 
applied in this case, the Court determined—without the benefit 
-4-
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of the Board's finding on the subject—that the exception did not 
apply in this case. The Court stated: 
[T]here is no basis in this case for concluding that it 
would have been appropriate to invoke the "just and 
equitable" exception to the general rule and to hold 
that the pooling order, on the particular facts of this 
case, should have been made effective, prior to the 
entry of the spacing order. 
Slip On. 14. This conclusion rests on factual assumptions that 
cannot be found in the record and that were never considered by 
the Board. 
For example, this Court assumed that Celsius or the BLM 
could, in 1983 or earlier, have successfully either voluntarily 
pooled the Federal Tract with the Baird Tract or else obtained a 
variance from the Board' s Rule C-3 permitting a second gas well 
in the north half of section 10. The Court assumed that in 1983 
or earlier, the BLM had sufficient knowledge of the subsurface 
geology to have "taken some action" to protect its share of gas 
in the pool.3 
The Board was not presented with these specific factual 
questions and did not decide them. To the extent that the Board 
3 The Court stated: 
Furthermore, the BLM was aware that the Ucolo No. 2 well 
had been completed in a known geologic formation, 
providing it with some basis for surmising that the 
[well] might drain gas from under the BLM tract. Under 
those circumstances, the BLM might have taken some 
action, but it did not. 
5UP &L 14. 
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considered the equities of the case, it found that it could not 
allow the respondents to retain more than their share of 
royalties relating to the period of production prior to entry of 
the spacing order.4 The important point, however, is that this 
Court should allow the Board the opportunity to address these 
critical factual matters in the first instance. 
In Reimschissel v. Russell, 640 P. 2d 26, 27 (Utah 
1982), this Court held, "It is not our prerogative to determine 
whether the evidence preponderated on one side or the other. 
That is the responsibility of the trier of fact." In this case, 
the trier of fact should be allowed to discharge its 
responsibility. Remand would allow the Board to decide the 
question whether Celsius or the BLM could have taken some 
meaningful action to protect the Federal Tract from drainage 
during the period prior to entry of the spacing order. Remand 
would allow the Board to decide in the first instance whether any 
other "special circumstances" exist that would require a 
4
 The Board noted that exploration in the general area of 
the parties' tracts is "expensive and high risk," and that only 
through "lengthy tests" after the commencement of production could 
the outer limits of the pool be determined. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order (June 26, 1985) at 5. With these 
considerations in mind, the Board held that Rule C-3(b) precluded 
the drilling of an additional well in the north half of the 
section and that there were no special circumstances that would 
require a departure from what it thought was the general rule 
requiring pooling back to first production. Id. at 10. (A copy of 
the Board7 s order was annexed as Appendix" 2 to our opening brief. ) 
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departure from the general rule announced by the Court. Remand 
would allow the BLM to defend itself against the charge (raised 
by respondents on appeal to the district court) that it waived 
its rights by failing to act.5 The Board should be given the 
opportunity to consider these matters after hearing evidence 
presented by the parties. 
II. THE COURT S FINDING THAT THE BLM WAIVED ITS RIGHTS 
THROUGH INACTION IS WRONG AND LACKS SUPPORT IN THE 
RECORD 
We respectfully submit that there is no evidence in the 
record that either Celsius or the BLM could have obtained a 
spacing order earlier than 1985. Indeed, as noted above, the 
inability to obtain technical information precluded the 
possibility of such an order before the Board' s entry of the 
spacing order in early 1985. There is no evidence in the record 
that Celsius or the BLM could have obtained an exception to Rule 
C-3 at any time. 6 There is no evidence in the record that the 
5
 The United States participated in the hearing before the 
Board but was not joined in the action before the district court, 
where respondents contended that the BLM had waived its rights. 
After receipt of pleadings in which this issue was raised, Celsius 
asserted as a defense that under Rule 19, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure. respondents had to join the United States as a 
necessary party. Celsius reasserted this defense at every 
opportunity, but both the respondents and the district court 
ignored the problem. 
6
 Rule C-3' s explicit purpose is to prevent waste. Neither 
Celsius nor the BLM could in good faith have asked the Board for 
an exception to Rule C-3 in order to drill a second well to drain 
hydrocarbons already being drained by" the'existing well. As noted 
in footnote 4, above, the Board found that Rule C-3(b) precluded 
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respondents would have voluntarily pooled their interests with 
the BLM if a request had been made prior to the entry of the 
spacing order. 
Under these circumstances, this Court erred in 
determining that the BLM waived its right to claim a share of the 
pool before the spacing order was entered. As this Court held in 
Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P. 2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983): 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. To constitute a waiver, there must 
be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquishment. It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied. 
In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the BLM had 
knowledge of any existing right to share in production during the 
relevant period. There is certainly no evidence of any 
intention, on the part of the BLM, to waive any such right. The 
Court' s conclusion that the BLM waived its right was mistaken. 
To allow the parties to present evidence on this issue, this case 
should be remanded to the Board for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
This petition is not directed at the new rule of law 
announced in the Court' s recent decision in this case. Rather, 
we believe that the Court erroneously assumed facts that were 
a second well. The Board' s conclusion was based in part on a 
policy derived from dicta in Bennion v. Board of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 675 P. 2d 1135 (Utah 1983J. ' See Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order at pp. 10-11. 
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never decided by the Board. The Court has now provided the Board 
with the legal framework. It should remand the case to the Board 
for resolution of the factual issues that are now relevant. The 
Legislature has entrusted the Board with the responsibility to 
protect correlative rights and discourage waste, and it should be 
allowed to evaluate the facts of this case in light of the 
Court' s interpretation of the Act. This petition should be 
granted. 
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